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I;, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
-vs-

Case No. 7106

BYRON S. AMBROSE,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

STATEMEHT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a criminal action brought by the State of Utah
against the Defendant-Appellant, BYRON S. AMBROSE, alleging that
the Defendant-Appellant intentionally or knowingly attempted to
cause the death of Gordon Birrell, in violation of Utah Code
Annotated (1953), Sections 76-4-101 and 76-5-203, a felony of
the second degree.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Defendant-Appellant was convicted by a jury and was
represented by his court appointed attorney, D. John Musselman,
Esq.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Defendant-Appellant seeks a reversal of his conviction
and dismissal of the charges or in the alternative, a new trial.
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STATEI!EllT OF THE FACTS
The Defendant-Appellant was tried twice in six months
for attempted homicide arising from separate factual situations.
This appeal directly concerns the second trialof September 14
and 15, 1978.

The first trial resulted in a mistrial and this

court held that a retrial was barred by the double jeopardy
provision of the Utah and Federal Constitutions. State of Utah
v. Ambrose, 598 P.2d 354 (1979).
During the course of the second trial, Frank Hitchell,
alleged victim of the first incident, entered the courtroom,
and the trial judge immediately called a recess.

The judge

asked Mr. Mitchell not to remain in the courtroom but allowed
Mitchell's wife to stay in the audience.

Mitchell remained in

the courthouse accessible to the jury during breaks and recesses.
No action was taken by the judge to isolate the jury from any
prejudicial actions by Mitchell, his wife, or other third persons.
The critical factual dispute in this case concerned the
actual incident of the shooting.

The prosecutor, in his closing

argument to the jury, characterized the dispute as one of believing
either the alleged victim or the defendant-appellant.

To destroy

the credibility of the defendant-appellant, the prosecutor relied
substantially on evidence concerning the shots fired and the
truck that was hit by those shots.

Evidence was offered to

explain the route of the bullets after they hit the truck.
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The police impounded the truck as evidence and the truck remained
in their custody until "we [the police] had gotten what we [the
police) needed from it."

Then the truck was released to the

registered owner in Colorado.

The police did not perform any

ballistics tests on the truck and released it without informing
the defendant-appellant.

The defendant-appellant did not have

the opportunity to perform any tests on the truck, or use the
truck as evidence to bolster his credibility.
the defendant-appellant guilty.

The jury found

Currently the defendant-appellant

is incarcerated in the Utah State Prison.
POIN? I
THE PROSECUTION BREACHED THEIR DUTY TO PREVENT THE LOSS
OR DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE FAVORABLE TO THE ACCUSED IN VIOLATION
OF DUE PROCESS.
The prosecution in theclosing argument of this trial
properly characterized the factual dispute to be resolved by the
jury as deciding to believe either the alleged victim or to believe
the defendant-appellant.

(T 251:12-23)

The prosecution strongly

emphasized conflicting testimony between officer Bath and the
defendant-appellant concerning the truck that received the bulk
of the shots which were fired.

(T 251-253)

The Orem Police

Department retained custody of the impounded truck as evidence
until "we [the police) had gotten what we [the police) needed from
it," and then it was released without notice to the defendantappellant to the registered owner in Colorado.

(T 151:5-14).
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No ballistics tests were performed on the truck by the police
(T 150 and T 235: 23-27) and the defendant-appellant did not
have any opportunity to perform tests on the truck or use the
truck to establish his credibility.

The defendant was convicted.

This court has recognized that the prosecution is under
a duty to treat the accused fairly (State of Utah v. Adams, 583
P.2d 89 (1978)) and that a deliberate suppression or destruction
of evidence by the prosecution constitutes a denial of due
process if the evidence is material to the guilt or innocence
of the accused.
(Utah 1975)

State of Utah v. Stewart, 544 P.2d 477-479

The duty to treat the defendant fairly extends

not only to a deliberate destruction but also the negligent
destruction of evidence material to the defense is tanamount to
unlawful suppression and a denial of due process.
Harmes, 38 Colo. App. 378, 560 P.2d 470 (1976).

People v.
Those charged

with the prosecution have a duty to seek justice (Code of Professional Responsiblity, Canon 7, EC 7-13; see also ABA, Standards
Relating to the Prosecution Function) and to prevent the loss or
destruction of evidence favorable to the accused.

People v.

Roblas, 568 P.2d 57 (Colo. 1977).
The duty of fairness to the accused also requires the
prosecutionto affirmatively preserve evidence.

This court

recognized that principle in State of Utah v. Stewart, supra at
479:
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"Those charged with investigation and r:>rosecution of
crime should retain intact all records and other evidence
pertaining to the case until it is finally disposed of."
The Supreme Court of Arizona in State v. Maloney, 105 Ariz. 348,
352, 464 P.2d 793, cert. denied, sub nom. Maloney v. Arizona,
400 U.S. 841, 91 S. Ct. 82, 27 L. Ed.2d 75 (1970), stated:
"[C]learly the state is not to decide for the court what is
admissible, or, for the defense, what is useful."

See also:

Scales v. City Court, Citv of llesa, 122 Ariz. 231, 594 P.2d 97
( 1979) .
The State must, in order to insure due process under the
5th and 14th Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and under
Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution, collect and
preserve evidence that is reasonably and foreseeably favorable
to the accused, especially when that evidence is in the immediate
control of the prosecution. The Colorado Supreme Court in Garcia
v. District Court, 21st Judicial District recently held:
"The failure of the state to collect and preserve
evidence, when those acts can be accomplished as a mere
incident to a procedure routinely performed by state
agents, is tanamount to suppression of that evidence.
It is incumbent upon the state to employ regular procedures to preserve evidence which a state agent, in the
regular performance of his duties, could reasonably
foresee 'might' be 'favorable' to the accused."
[emphasis added] 589 P.2d 924 (Colo. 1979).
Error is committed where the destroyed or lost evidence
may have created a reasonable doubt of the accused's guilt.
U. S. v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 96 S.CT. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976).
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If the accused can make a showing of materiality of the lost
evidence and prejudice to the accused, then the State's failure
to preserve a truck should have resulted in a disnissal of the
criminal charges.

State of Idaho v. White, 98 Idaho 781, 572

P.2d 884 (1977).
In this case, the prosecution breached their duty of
fairness to the accused and violated the accused's right of due
process by failing to prevent the loss or destruction of evidence
favorable to him.

The Orem Police Department knew or should have

known that a vehicle substantially involved in an alleged attempted
homicide could be evidence favorable to the accused.

The credi-

bility of the accused's testimony turned directly on the evidence
of the shooting and the truck and the prosecutor so argued to
the jury.

The police failed to preserve the impounded vehicle in

their possession and did not perform ballistics tests on the
vehicle.

The accused did not have the opportunity to so test the

vehicle since the vehicle was returned to its owner in Colorado.
If the accused had the opportunity to test the evidence, he may
have bolstered his credibility before the jury and received an
acquital.

Because the error commited was prejudicial to the

defendant-appellant his conviction should be reversed and the
charges dismissed on grounds that defendant's due process rights
were violated.
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POINT II
THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT WAS DENIED THE EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO ADEQUATELY TAKE
MEASURES TO PRESERVE EVIDENCE FAVORABLE TO THE ACCUSED AND HOVE
FOR DISMISSAL BASED ON THE LOSS OF FAVORABLE EVIDENCE.
Mr. D. John Musselman, Esq., was the court appointed
attorney for the defendant-appellant during his trial of September
14 and 15, 1978.

As previously argued in Point I of this brief,

certain crucial evidence favorable to the defendant (a truck)
was not preserved for trial and was unavailable for the accused's
defense.

Further, the record as a whole discloses that defendant's

court appointed counsel failed to move for a dismissal based upon
the loss of favorable evidence.
The 6th and 14th Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and
Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution guarantee that the
accused is entitled to the effective assistance of court appointed
counsel if indigent.

Webster v. Jones, 587 P.2d 528 (Utah 1978).

The test this court has adopted to examine the effectiveness of
defense counsel was stated in State of Utah v. McNicol, 554 P.2d
203 (Utah 1976):
"The record must establish that counsel was ignorant of
the facts or the law, resulting in withdrawal of a crucial
defense, reducing the trial to a 'farce and a sham.'"
supra at 204.
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The Court in McNicol, supra, recognized the vital distinction
between a constitutionally adequate defense consisting of a
careful factual and legal investigation and tactical or strategic
decisions after a careful factual and legal inquiry.
A careful factual investigation by the defendant's
counsel would have disclosed the vital importance the truck would
hold in determining what happened at the scene of the alleged
crime and in determining the credibility of the accused.

It is

not unreasonable to expect that the defendant would want his own
ballistic reports on the gun and on the truck to establish his
only defense.
Most importantly, the defendant should not be punished
or penalized for his court appointed counsel's procrastination
in seeking to preserve relevant and favorable evidence. People
v. Harmes, 38 Colo. App.

378, 560 P.2d 470 (1976).

Further, once defense counsel had determined that the
trial would turn on such factual evidence, and that such evidence
was no longer available due to actions of the police (See Point
in this brief), a careful legal inquiry into relevant law would
have disclosed that a motion to dismiss should have been granted
on the grounds that evidence favorable to the accused was lost or
destroyed by the police.

(See Point I of this brief).
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The only reasonable explanation for the record in this
case, is that the defense counsel was ignorant of the facts
because of a lack of investigation and that he was unaware of
relevant law that resulted in the withdrawal of a crucial defense
reducing the trial to a sham.

Had competent counsel been aware

of the facts and law of this case, competency would require
affirmative action to preserve the evidence or alternatively, a
motion to dismiss based upon the loss or destruction of evidence
favorable to the accused that was in police custody.

The record

does not disclose any action by counsel to preserve the truck as
evidence, or to move to dismiss on grounds of prosecution destruction of evidence.

Such error was prejudicial to the accused and

denied him the effective assistance of court appointed counsel.
Therefore, alternatively, the defendant-appellant's
conviction should be reversed and the case dismissed.
POINT III
THE TRIAL JUDGE FAILED TO TAKE PROPER PROTECTIVE MEASURES
TO ISOLATE THE JURY FRO!! PREJUDICIAL ACTIONS AND INFORMATION IN
VIOLATION OF THE ACCUSED'S RIGHTS TO AN HIPARTIAL JURY AND DUE
PROCESS.

The record discloses that during the course of this trial,
the alleged victim of the accused in a previous trial, Frank
~itchell,

entered the courtroom during the testimony and the

trial judge immediately called a recess.

(T 112:9-30, 113, 114,
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115:1-29).

Mitchell's wife was also present during the trial.

Mitchell was asked to leave the courtroom but was allowed to
remain in the courthouse, accessible to the jurors.
Mitchell's wife remained in the courtroom (T 115).

(T 242, 243).
No action

was taken by the trial judge to prevent further prejudicial
occurances to the jury.
It is well established in Utah "that due process requirements of the Constitution of Utah and the United States guarantee
that an accused receive a trial before a fair and impartial jury
free from outside influences."

State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338,

1348 (Utah 1977) cert. denied 439 U.S. 882 (1978).

Further, the

U. S. Supreme Court has mandated that when necessary the trial
judge must take appropriate measures to maintain a fair and
impartial jury free from outside influences.

Sheppard v. Maxwell,

384 U.S. 333, 86 S.CT. 1507, 16 L.Ed. 2d 600 (1966).

See also:

State v. Jarrett, 112 Utah 335, 187 P.2d 547 (1947).
Recently the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the trial
judge has the affirmative constitutional duty to minimize
prejudicial acts and may order sequestration of the jury or take
any of a variety of protective measures even when they are not
strictly and inescapably necessary in order to insure that
inadmissible prejudicial information be kept from the jury.
Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale,
(1979).

u.s.

, 99 S.Ct. 2898

Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court in DePasquale, supra,

held that the right to an impartial jury is personal to the
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accused and that members of the public have no constitutional
right to attend criminal trials.

Thus, the public may be excluded

from criminal trials.
The failure of the trial judge to exclude both Frank
Mitchell and his wife from the courtroom and the courthouse where
the jury was present during breaks and recesses was prejudicial
error in light of the informative record.

(T 248:8-11)

Alter-

natively, the trial judge should have taken other protective
measures such as sequestration to isolate the jury from any
potential prejudicial comments or actions.

The record discloses

that poor facilities were perhaps the underlying reason for not
sequestering the jury.

(T 18:15-18).

Therefore, because of the actual prejudicial actions
that took place in or near the courtroom, the trial judge failed
to take necessary protective measures such as exclusion of the
public and sequestration of the jury to preserve the accused's
right to trial by an impartial jury and right to due process
guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution, Sixth Amendnent and the
Utah Consititution, Article I, Section 12.

Such failure resulted

in actual prejudice to the accused and the defendant-appellant's
conviction should be reversed and a new trial granted.
CONCLUSION
The loss or destruction of evidence favorable to the
defendant was a breach of the prosecution's duty of fairness and
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violative of due process.

Said breach requires the conviction

to be reversed and the case dismissed.

Alternatively, said

loss or destruction of favorable evidence was caused by ineffective
court appointed counsel because of counsel's ignorance of the facts
and of the law resulting in the withdrawal of a crucial defense
to the accused which reduced the trial to a sham, requiring a
reversal of the conviction and dismissal of the action.
r,roreover, the trial judge failed to take proper protective
measures to preserve the accused's constitutional right to trial
by an impartial jury.

Under this theory, the conviction must

be reversed and remanded for a new trial.
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